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1Abstract
We estimate the eect of imported machines on the wages of machine
operators utilizing Hungarian linked employer-employee data. We infer ex-
posure to imported machines from detailed trade statistics of the rm and
the occupation description of the worker. We nd that workers exposed to
imported machines earn about 8 percent higher wages than other machine
operators at the same rm. When we proxy for unobserved worker char-
acteristics, we nd a signicant 3 percent wage premium, suggesting that
the relationship is causal. The return to schooling is also higher on im-
ported machines. We build a simple matching model consistent with these
ndings. Our ndings suggest that machine imports can be an important
channel through which skill-biased technical change reaches less developed
and emerging economies.
2Introduction
The vast majority of machinery production is concentrated in a handful of ad-
vanced economies. As a consequence, most other countries rely heavily on ma-
chinery imports (Eaton and Kortum 2001, Caselli and Wilson 2004). Imported
machines have a wide ranging impact on the economy. They contribute to capital
accumulation and growth (De Long and Summers 1991, Alfaro and Hammel 2007)
and they can be a source of R&D spillovers (Coe and Helpman 1995, Keller 2004).
In this paper we argue that they also increase the demand for skilled labor.
Our starting point is that machines produced in advanced economies are more
sophisticated and of a higher quality than those produced in a less developed
country. Most Indian users nd computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine
tools imported from Japan and Taiwan to be more reliable, more accurate and
more productive than similar Indian machines (Sutton 2000).
Sophisticated machines, in turn, require highly trained, skillful and attentive
operators. Operating CNC lathes, for example, requires more training than oper-
ating traditional lathes.1 More broadly, computerization has increased the demand
for complex skills (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003), even within the same occupa-
tion (Spitz-Oener 2006).2 In other words, the technology embodied in up-to-date
sophisticated machines is skill biased. Taken together, we argue that importing
machines from advanced economies amounts to importing skill-biased technical
change.
We estimate how imported machines have shaped the wages of machine opera-
tors in Hungary between 1994 and 2004. We infer exposure to imported machines
from detailed trade statistics of the rm and the occupation description of the
worker. We nd that workers exposed to imported machines earn about 8 percent
higher wages than other machine operators at the same rm. This suggests that
imported capital and worker skill are complementary.
The period of our study was characterized by rapid trade liberalization, espe-
cially with respect to the European Union which Hungary joined in 2004.3 Liber-
1Around a quarter of the lessons associated with CNC lathing oered at toolingu.com are
directly associated with CNC programming.
2Our paper is related to the vast literature on computerization and skill-biased technical
change, surveyed in Katz and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu (2002). The key dierence is that
we study wages and technology choice within a narrow occupation and not the broad trends in
inequality.
3The free trade agreement between the European Community and Hungary reduced taris
substantially. The average tari on machinery imports was 10 percent in 1992 and below 1
percent in 1997. Taris had been completely phased out by 2001.
3alization coincided with a surge in machine imports. There was a gradual increase
in machine imports during the 1980s, which accelerated sharply in the rst half
of the 1990s. By 1995, an overwhelming majority of machinery was coming from
imports.
We use linked employer-employee data on a six-percent representative sample
of Hungarian machine operators. We link each operator to the import ows of
her employer. For each rm, Customs Statistics record all the import transactions
between 1992 and 2003, their precise product classication and country of origin.
We can thus distinguish machine operators who work at a rm using only domestic
machines from those who work at a rm that has recently purchased an imported
machine. Moreover, the product classication allows us to select the machines that
are most relevant for the operator's occupation. For example, \printing machine
operators" are linked with \oset printing machinery," but not with \metal lathes."
Our ndings show that workers at rms that import their specic machinery
earn 10.5 percent more than workers with no access to imported machinery of
their specic occupation. Some of this wage dierential may be due to omitted
rm characteristics. Importing rms may be more productive, better managed,
and may be able to attract a better workforce. When we contrast operators (e.g.,
printing machine operators) working at rms that import their specic machines
(e.g., oset printing machine) machines to those working at rms that import
machines unrelated to their occupation (e.g., metal lathes), we nd a wage gap of
8.2 percent. This is our preferred estimate of the eect of imported machinery on
wages.
The dierence in wages reects dierences in skill as well as dierences in the
returns to skill. Among workers operating domestic machines, the wage gap be-
tween those with completed high school and those with primary schooling is 6.9
percent. Among those working on imported machines, the return to a secondary
degree is 11.3 percent. This suggests that imported machines increase the returns
to skill substantially. However, much of the skills of machine operators are unob-
servable and are only partially explained by formal schooling. This is important,
because imported machines are operated by better skilled workers than domestic
ones, and hence our estimated wage dierential is the combined eect of increased
returns to skill and unobserved skill dierences.4
In order to dierentiate the causal eect of imported machines from unobserved
heterogeneity in worker skill, we pursue a xed eects strategy. In our data, the
same individuals are sampled in multiple waves, but cannot be linked over time.
4See DiNardo and Pischke (1997) and Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) in the context of
the wage eects of computers estimated by Krueger (1993).
4Nonetheless, the sampling design permits us to construct a pseudo-panel of work-
ers, in which we group workers based on a number of observable characteristics.
We nd that the wages of the worker increase by about 3 percent after she receives
a related imported machine.
The richness of the import data permits us to explore the sources of the wage
eect in more detail. In particular, we can ask if imports from countries on the
technology frontier matter more. We select 10 OECD countries in which R&D
expenditures in the machinery sector have exceeded 3.8 percent of value added.5
We nd that it is only these imports that matter; imports from other countries
have no signicant eect on wages. This reinforces the interpretation that the
machines embody sophisticated, skill biased technology.
What lies behind these wage patterns? We build a simple matching model
along the lines of Roy (1951), Jovanovic (1998), and Yeaple (2005) to provide an
answer. Workers are heterogeneous in (unobserved) human capital, while machines
are heterogeneous in their quality. Imported machines, in particular, are higher
quality than domestic ones, but they are also more expensive. There is a xed
supply of workers who are hired in an ecient labor market. Machine quality and
worker human capital are supermodular in the production function: the returns
to skill are higher on higher-quality machines. This immediately gives rise to a
strong sorting result: workers above a certain threshold of skill all work on imported
machines, while those below work on domestic machines.
We conduct a simple trade liberalization experiment within the model by re-
ducing the relative price of imported machines. In response, a bigger set of rms
begins importing. These new importers are better than non-importers, but worse
than continuous importers. Workers at these rms enjoy a discrete jump in their
wages in response to their increased marginal product. Interestingly, continuous
importers also enjoy wage increases due to general equilibrium eects. Because im-
ported machines are now cheaper, if skilled wages remained the same, new entrants
could make a prot by buying an imported machine and hiring a skilled worker.
Competition for skilled workers increases their wage, even if in equilibrium their
employer does not upgrade their machines.
The model is consistent with both the cross-section and the time-series evi-
dence on wages. Workers on imported machines earn more than those on domestic
machines. They also enjoy a higher return to their skill. Workers whose employer
has just started to import receive a discrete jump in their wages. As predicted by
5The countries are Sweden, Norway, Japan, Belgium, South Korea, Finland, Germany, Den-
mark, USA, and the UK. We use the OECD R&D statistics reported in Table 2 of Acharya and
Keller (2009).
5the model, a lot of importing rms in a worker's sector raise the worker's wage if
they already import, but not if they still use a domestic machine.
The model also makes predictions about the timing of imports. Firms with
the best workers start importing rst. The productivity of their skilled operators
makes it protable for them to buy the better machine even when taris are high.
As taris continue to fall, the threshold of importers keeps falling and rms with
a poorer and poorer pool of workers start importing. This prediction is also borne
out by the data. We distinguish early importers as those workers who were among
the rst 50 percent of workers to receive imported machines. If we rank workers by
their wages, early importers are at the top of the distribution, while late importers
are at the bottom of the distribution.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to provide micro evidence
on how imported technology changes the demand for skill. In parallel work, Parro
(2010) develops a quantitative model of trade to show that trade in capital goods,
together with capital-skill complementarity can explain a large fraction of the
increase in the skill premium worldwide. The main dierence between his work and
ours is that he uses aggregate data (capital goods vs other goods) to quantify the
role of \skill-biased trade," whereas we provide more direct micro-level evidence.
Our work is also related to several studies that show that technology transfers
are embodied in imports. Coe and Helpman (1995) show that countries importing
from high-R&D partners have high productivity. Acharya and Keller (2009) nd
similar results at the industry level. Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2010) show that
rms importing their intermediate inputs are more productive, partly because these
inputs are of a higher quality.
Understanding machine imports as a source of technology transfer can shed
light on why wage and income inequality has increased tremendously in develop-
ing countries, and why these increases have mostly coincided with periods of trade
liberalization (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), for a survey). Most researchers
point to skill-biased technical change (SBTC) as an explanation. Given, however,
that most skill-biased technologies are developed in advanced economies, the liber-
alization of capital imports is a necessary condition for SBTC to reach developing
countries. Consistent with this reasoning, Alfaro and Hammel (2007) show that
(capital account) liberalization in emerging economies was followed by a surge in
capital imports.
Other papers have also explored links between between technology choice and
trade liberalization. Costantini and Melitz (2008) and Yeaple (2005) build models
in which technology choice and trading status are correlated: exporting rms are
more likely to use advanced technologies. Verhoogen (2008) nds that Mexican
6exporters upgraded both their technology and the skill of their workforce after the
1994 devaluation of the peso, because better skilled workers are required to produce
the high quality goods that are in demand in export markets. Bustos (2011) nds
that the MERCOSUR trade agreement has led Argentine rms to export more
and, concurrently, to upgrade their technology. She builds a model in which export
expansion helps rms overcome the xed costs of technology adoption. All these
papers link technology upgrading to the export decisions of rms. Our model
relates it to imported capital goods. The key dierences are that (i) imports are
subject to the domestic trade policies, so even unilateral liberalizations can lead to
SBTC, and that, (ii) in developing countries, the use of imported machinery can
aect a larger set of workers than technology upgrading by exporters.
More broadly, our ndings that machine quality and worker skills are com-
plementary lend support to the view that complementarities are an important
feature of the development process (see Kremer (1993), and Jones (2011)). If
skilled workers are required to operate new, more advanced technologies, then the
lack of adequate education and training is a barrier to the spillover of technolo-
gies. Moreover, if labor market institutions do not facilitate the ecient matching
of workers with machines, aggregate productivity will be substantially lower (see
B enabou (1996)). Both eects make it harder for poor countries to catch up with
the productivity frontier, magnifying dierences in income per capita.
The paper is organized as follows. The rst Section introduces the data set
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 2 examines how machine opera-
tor wages are aected by machine imports. Section 3 introduces a simple model of
worker{machine assignment that is consistent with the uncovered empirical regu-
larities. The model has additional implications about the eects of trade liberal-
ization which are then taken to the data. Section 4 oer discusses extensions of
the empirical exercise, and Section 5 concludes.
1 Data
We use linked employer-employee data. Employee data come from the Hungarian
Structure of Earnings Survey (B ertarifa), which contains a 6 percent quasi-random
sample of all employees (10 percent for white-collar workers), recording their earn-
ings, 4-digit occupation, education, age and gender. We use the annual waves
between 1994 and 2004, and limit our sample to 64 machine operating occupations
(excluding vehicle drivers, see Table A.1 in the Appendix), resulting in about
20,000 employees per year.
7In our benchmark specication, we limit the sample to rms that have at least
50 employees, because the sampling procedure of B ertarifa is somewhat dierent
for smaller rms. Results are virtually unchanged if we include all rms. We drop
all part-time employees and those earning less than the minimum wage. We also
drop rm-occupation-year cells in which there are more than 20 employees because
we are likely to measure the import exposure of these workers with high error (see
below). Again, results are not sensitive to these adjustments. Our nal sample
includes 8{10,000 employees per year (see Table 1).
Each employer is matched to its Customs Statistics (CS) record based on a
unique rm identier. The CS contains the universe of trading rms, recording
their exports and imports in 6-digit Harmonized System product breakdown for all
years from 1992 to 2003. For each worker in B ertarifa, we can precisely identify the
international transactions of his/her employer. In particular, not only do we see
whether the employer imported any machinery in the past, we also see the specic
equipment goods that it imported. We restrict our attention to 260 specialized
machines and instruments that can be associated with a particular industry and
occupation.6 We exclude general purpose machines (e.g., computers) and tools
(e.g., screwdrivers) because they can be used by a wide range of workers, not only
machine operators. Around one third of all imports of machinery, vehicles and
instruments is spent on such specialized machines.
We match the 4-digit occupation codes (FEOR) to the 6-digit product codes
(HS) to identify machines and their operators. For example, FEOR code 8127 cov-
ers \Printing machine operators." This code is matched with \Photo-typesetting
and composing machines" (HS code 844210), as well as with \Reel fed oset print-
ing machinery" (844311), but not with \Machines for weaving fabric, width < 30
cm" (844610). Note that this is a many-to-many match: the average occupation
is associated with 5.5 machines, and the average machine is associated with 1.3
occupations. The Appendix provides the details of this matching procedure, and
Table A3 lists several examples of these matches. For each occupation o let o
denote the set of products that are matched.
For each worker in each year, we create a measure of access to imported machin-
ery, which takes the value of one if the employer imported machine(s) specic to
the worker's occupation any time in the past, and zero otherwise.7 More formally,
let Mflt denote the amount of imports of product l by rm f in year t. Then we
6Table A2 in the Appendix lists these machines.
7This assumes that machines do not depreciate. We also experimented with a 5-year lifetime
for imported machines as well as a 10 percent annual depreciation. Results were very similar.





1 if maxst;l2o Mfls >  ws;
0 otherwise.
(1)
This index will take the value one if any of the products related to occupation o
had imports higher than the average wage  ws in any year s prior to (and including)
year t. We only count imports that are of higher value than the average wage to
capture the purchase of a big piece of machinery that may aect wage setting at
the rm. (Sometimes parts of the machine are classied within the same 6-digit
product code.) If we include all positive imports, the results are similar.
Similarly, we dene the import exposure of the rm as a dummy for having





1 if maxst Mfls >  wt;
0 otherwise.
(2)
Clearly, Gft = maxo Sfot, that is, if any occupation is exposed to imports at the
rm, the rm as a whole is also exposed.
Our identication strategy makes use of the fact that, for some workers, Sfot 6=
Gft. These are workers whose rm has imported a machine, but one that is not
related to their occupation. These workers will serve as a control group for workers
at the same rm in related occupations (see Section 2).
Table 1 reports the number of workers in each treatment category. The em-
ployer of around one third of the workers never imports any machinery during
the sample period. Around one quarter works in a rm that has imported, but
not their related machine. The remainder is exposed to imports of their related
machine. The majority of imports come from high-R&D countries.
There are two potential sources of error with the measure Sfot. First, if some
rms import capital indirectly, then we will classify some importers as nonim-
porters. This issue is not very severe for specialized machines, for which only 22
percent of the total imports was purchased by intermediary rms (wholesalers and
retailers) in 1999, and the rest went directly to manufacturers.
Second, we do not know which worker within the specic occupation received
the machine. If there are multiple machine operators in the same occupation at the
same rm and only one of them is assigned the machine, we will wrongly classify
the others as importers. This measurement error is more severe in large rms. We
hence restricted the sample to rm{occupation{year cells which contain 20 workers
or less.8
8In alternative specications (not reported), we restricted the sample to rms and occupations
of which there is only one worker in the sample. The results are indeed stronger in this case.
9Table 1: Number of workers in each treatment category
Year








from top 10 Total
1994 3,420 2,519 688 1,717 8,344
1995 2,952 2,759 768 2,240 8,719
1996 2,701 2,573 797 2,283 8,354
1997 2,187 2,242 652 2,393 7,474
1998 2,486 2,457 795 2,651 8,389
1999 2,435 2,288 707 2,907 8,337
2000 2,736 2,495 801 3,075 9,107
2001 2,711 2,391 845 3,155 9,102
2002 3,245 2,692 770 3,246 9,953
2003 3,163 2,622 765 3,350 9,900
2004 3,871 2,792 762 3,482 10,907
Both measurement errors lead to an attenuation bias, hence our estimates of
the wage eect can be understood as a lower bound. For expositional clarity,
we refer to workers at a rm importing their specic machinery as \working on
imported machines," and all other workers as \working on domestic machines,"
but the reader should bear in mind these caveats.
1.1 Variables and descriptive statistics
We are primarily interested in the wage eect of imported machines. Wages are
measured as regular monthly earnings in the month of May, plus 1/12 of the
overtime and other bonuses paid in the previous year. (Results are similar if we
omit bonuses.)
We have categorical indicators for schooling, recording whether the worker
has complete or incomplete primary, secondary, or tertiary education. Secondary
degrees are further divided into vocational training (a mostly 3-year program pro-
viding practical training for skilled occupations) and the academic track (a 4- or
5-year program making one eligible for college admission).
We also record rm characteristics that likely aect wage setting. B ertarifa
reports the total employment of the rm, and whether or not it is foreign owned.
Both size (Oi and Idson 1999) and foreign ownership (Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey
101996, Brown, Earle and Telegdy 2010) are known to be positively correlated with
wages.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics about the main variables used in
the analysis. Around three quarters of our sample are male. Around two thirds
of the workers have completed (some form of) high school, the rest have primary
schooling or are high school dropouts. Slightly more than a quarter of the workers
are employed by foreign-owned rms.
The table also reports the characteristics separately for importers and non-
importers. Importers are more likely to be female, younger, more educated, earn
higher wages, work at larger rms, and are more likely to work at a foreign rm. In
other words, importing rms are \special" and have a special workforce (Bernard,
Jensen and Schott 2009, Halpern et al. 2010). It will hence be important to control
for rm characteristics in the wage regressions.










Gender (1 if male) 0.720 0.635 0.776 -47.03
Age (years) 39.443 10.571 38.366 40.143 -25.92
Education (1 if finished high school) 0.619 0.632 0.611 6.51
Monthly earning, log 10.951 0.626 11.107 10.849 64.59
Firm total employment, log 4.962 1.782 5.623 4.533 97.68
Firm is foreign owned 0.286 0.461 0.172 97.86
1.2 Pseudo-panel
B ertarifa does not provide an individual identier, so we cannot link workers over
time. However, sampling is based on the date of birth, those born on the 5th and
15th of the month are included in all waves (National Employment Service 2009).
This ensures that subsequent waves track mostly the same set of workers. We
exploit this feature of the data to construct a pseudo-panel.
We identify workers within the rm based on several observables: year of birth,
gender, occupation, and educational attainment. We create cells based on these
observables, and follow these cells over time. Table 3 reports some basic statistics
about these cells. More than 95 percent of the 51,322 cells are unique: they contain
only one worker. Of these, 16,355 cells can be followed over time, as they have
observation in more than one year. These cells likely contain the same worker in
11all the years. We can then identify from the time-series variation within these
cells. We use the cells with four or more years of data (in bold) in the xed-eects
estimation. There are 5,890 of these cells, covering 32,549 cell-year observations.







1 32,897 1,329 34,226
2 6,937 286 7,223
3 3,528 138 3,666
4 2,100 96 2,196
5 1,283 59 1,342
6 910 47 957
7 634 44 678
8 486 22 508
9 292 31 323
10 169 15 184
11 16 31 9
Total 49,252 2,070 51,322
2 Estimating the Wage Dierential
We estimate the eect of imported capital on wages in the following regression
equation:
wifot = Sfot + Gft + Xft + Zit + ot + uifot (3)
Log monthly earnings of worker i in year t, wit, depend on exposure to occupation-
specic machine imports Sfot, exposure to rm-level imports Gft, a vector of rm
controls Xft, a vector of individual controls Zit, occupation-specic time xed
eects ot, and an error term uifot. The index f denotes the rm of worker i at
time t, similarly, o denotes her occupation.
The total eect of machine imports on wages is  + . This includes the
occupation-specic and the rm-specic eects. The coecient  captures the
wage premium of unrelated machine operators at importing rms, relative to non-
importing rms. As importers and non-importers may have unobserved dierences,
 may be nonzero even if there are no causal eects of imports on wages. For
example, better educated managers may pay higher wages and be more likely to
import at the same time. Selection on such rm unobservables is captured by
12.9 We are therefore interested in the dierential eect on wages of related and
unrelated occupations within the rm. This is captured by . Such a dierential
eect across occupations suggests that the link between wages and imports is
technological.
Table 4: Imported machines and wages: pooled cross sections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imported machine specific to occupation 0.105*** 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Imported some machine 0.055*** -0.006
(0.007) (0.009)
From high-R&D country:
    Imported machine specific to occupation 0.072*** 0.041***
(0.009) (0.010)
    Imported some machine 0.094***
(0.009)
Firm employment (log) 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm has majority foreign owner 0.233*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.219***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
Occupation*year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 98,225 98,225 98,225 98,225
R-squared 0.413 0.415 0.415 0.419
Log monthly earnings
Notes: All regressions control for gender, a dummy for completed high school, age, age squared, and occupation*year fixed 
effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered by firm*year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 See text for sample definition and other details.
The results are reported in Table 4. The rst column only includes S, rm
and individual controls, but not G. Workers with exposure to imports of their
specic machine earn 10.5 percent more than workers with no access to imports,
9An alternative way of controlling for unobserved rm heterogeneity would be to include rm
xed eects. We have tried this and obtained similarly sized, but much less precise estimates
for . The intuition for why rm xed eect estimates are less precise is that they need both
related and unrelated occupations within the same rm. Given that the sample only covers 6
percent of workers, such rms are very rare. In contrast, our estimate of  relies on all rms
with unrelated occupations, including those who do not have a related occupation in the sample.
Given a precisely estimated , our  estimate is also precise.
13conditional on rm and individual controls. It is also clear that, consistently with
the previous literature, foreign ownership and rm size are positively related to
wages.
The second column reports our preferred specication, including both S and
G. Workers in unrelated occupations at importing rms earn 5.5 percent more
than workers at non-importers. Relative to unrelated workers, those in related
occupations earn 8.2 percent higher wage. The total wage premium of related
occupations is hence 13.7 percent, but 8.2 percent is our preferred estimate for the
causal eect.
Column 3 splits machine imports into two by the country of origin. \High-R&D
countries" are the top 10 countries by the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales in
the machinery sector. Machine imports from these countries are associated with a
5:3+7:2 = 12:5 percent wage premium. This is signicantly higher than the wage
premium associated with imports from low R&D countries, 5.3 percent.
Column 4 replicates the same split for related and unrelated occupations.
Workers in unrelated occupations at a rm which imports from a low-R&D country
do not enjoy any premium over non-importing workers (in fact, the point estimate
is negative). This suggests that there is no strong selection within this group of
rms. By contrast, workers at a rm which imported from a high-R&D coun-
try earn 9:4   0:6 = 8:8 percent more than non-importing workers, even if they
work in occupations unrelated to the machine. It seems that rms importing from
high-R&D countries are indeed \special." We are interested in, though, the wage
eects over and above this rm selection eect. These are positive and signi-
cant, 4 percent for low-R&D countries and 4:0 + 4:1 = 8:1 percent for high-R&D
countries.
If rms that import machines hire better machine operators, then uit will be
correlated with Sfot and Gft. We proxy for unobserved worker skill by exploiting
the time dimension of the pseudo-panel discussed in Section 1.2. We add cell xed
eects to equation (3),
wifot = Sfot + Gft + Xft + Zit + ifo + t + uifot; (4)
where Zit is now limited to the worker's age (other worker characteristics do not
vary over time), ifo is a cell xed eect and t is a time xed eect.
Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation (4). Now  can be interpreted
as a dierences-in-dierences estimate: by how much the wage of workers changes
after their employer imports its rst machine relative to workers at non-importers?
We see from columns 2 and 4 that there are no signicant wage increases for
14Table 5: Imported machines and wages: xed eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imported machine specific to occupation 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.004 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Imported some machine -0.019 -0.027*
(0.014) (0.016)
From high-R&D country:
    Imported machine specific to occupation 0.036*** 0.032**
(0.013) (0.013)
    Imported some machine 0.016
(0.014)
Firm employment (log) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm has majority foreign owner 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
Cell fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 32,549 32,549 32,549 32,549
R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862
Log monthly earnings
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, cell and year fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Cells are defined 
by birth year, gender, educational attainment, firm and occupation. Sample is restricted to single-worker cells. Standard 
errors (in parantheses) are clustered by firm*year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 See text for sample definition and other 
details.
unrelated occupations.10 By contrast, importing a machine related to the worker's
occupation increases her wage signicantly. The overall wage increase is about 3
percent (columns 1 and 2), and practically all of the eect comes from high-R&D
imports (columns 3 and 4).
The fact that the wages of workers in aected occupations increase after im-
ports suggest that machine imports do change the productivity and/or the wage
setting at the rm. That this eect is conned to related occupations suggests that
there is a technological reason for the link between imports and wages. Finally,
the fact that only imports from high-R&D countries matter lends credibility to the
idea that the wage gains are coming from the higher quality of these machines.
10This suggests that the positive estimated  in equation (3) might indeed be due to rm
selection.
15We now turn to asking how the returns to skill change with imported machines.
Table 6 regresses log monthly earnings on an indicator of education (a dummy for
completed high school), an import exposure indicator and their interaction. We
are interested in whether the wage gap between primary and high-school graduates
is larger among import-exposed workers. Column 1 shows that for workers with no
access to imported machine (either because their rm did not import a machine, or
it imported an unrelated machine), the high-school wage premium is 6.9 percent.
For those exposed to imports of their related machine, the high-school premium
is 6:9 + 4:4 = 11:3 percent, a signicant increase. In column 2, we ask whether
this increase in the high-school premium is specic to importing rms or import-
related occupations. We see that the the premium is higher by 1.5 percentage
points at importing rms, even for occupations unrelated to the imported machine.
This change in the premium is much smaller than that for related occupations
(1:5 + 3:4 = 4:9 percent), and only marginally signicant. Returns to experience
(as proxied by worker age) are also higher on imported machines (not reported
here).
In summary, imported machines seem to raise the return to observable skills,
consistent with a model where machine quality and worker skill are complementary.
It is such a model we turn to next.
3 A Model of Worker-Machine Assignment
In this section we develop a model of a small open economy, in which a constant
supply of workers is matched with domestic and imported machines. Workers
dier in skill, which is more productive on foreign machines than on domestic
ones. Firms decide which machine to buy and what type of worker to hire as its
operators.
Machines are indivisible. This nonconvexity leads to assignment and selection
patterns that are very similar to models based on xed cost of technology choice
(Yeaple (2005)). There are no increasing returns to scale, however, and we can
analyze a competitive equilibrium.
3.1 Workers
There is a mass L of workers, each possessing one from a continuum of skills.
The range of potential skills is normalized to [0;1]. Skills are distributed across
workers according to a continuous distribution with density function l(h) : [0;1] !
16Table 6: Imported machines and the returns to education
(1) (2)
Completed high school 0.069*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.006)
Imported machine specific to occupation 0.079*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.008)
Completed high school 0.044*** 0.034***
   * Imported machine specific to occupation (0.007) (0.008)
Imported some machine 0.046***
(0.009)
Completed high school 0.015*
   * Imported some machine (0.009)
Firm employment (log) 0.070*** 0.066***
(0.003) (0.003)
Firm has majority foreign owner 0.233*** 0.227***
(0.007) (0.007)
Individual controls YES YES




Notes: All regressions control for gender, age, age squared, and occupation*year fixed 
effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered by 
firm*year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 See text for sample definition and other details.
R. Workers supply their labor inelastically and spend all their wage income on
consuming the nal good.
Suppose that there exists a continuous and strictly increasing wage function
w(h) : [0;1] ! R giving the wage of a particular worker type h. We will later solve
for this function in equilibrium.
3.2 Machines
There are two types of machines, domestic and foreign. Domestic machines have
quality D, and foreign machines have quality F > D.
Domestic machines are produced by competitive rms using a linear technology.
It takes A units of the nal good to produce a domestic machine. This pins down
17the price of the domestic machine in terms of the nal good as pD = A.
Foreign machines are imported from abroad in exchange for exports of the nal
good. The world price of foreign machines is exogenously given, and is not aected
by local demand.
We assume that pF > pD = A, that is, foreign machines are traded at a
premium. This premium comes from two sources. First, these machines are of
a higher quality and arguably more expensive to produce. Second, the costs of
transportation and taris raise the price of foreign machines, while leaving that of
domestic machines unaected. Trade liberalization can hence reduce the price of
foreign machines.
In contrast to wages, machine prices are xed exogenously. This follows from
assuming a small open economy.
3.3 Firms
Each rm hires one worker and buys one machine to produce a nal good.11 Each
rm produces the same product, the price of which we normalize to one.
Output increases in both the quality of the machine and the skill of its operator,
Qi = F(i;hi); (5)
where Qi is output of rm i, i is the quality of its machine, and hi is the skill of its
operator. We assume that F is twice continuously dierentiable and satises the
Inada conditions. We also assume that Fh > 0, that is, the production function
is supermodular in machine quality and worker skill.12
Firms are identical ex ante. They hire workers and machines in competitive
markets so as to maximize their prots. That is, they take the price of machines
and the wages of workers as given. There is free entry into nal good production.
The prot maximum problem can be written as
max
fD;Fg;h
F(;h)   p()   w(h): (6)
Prots are revenues minus the price of a machine minus wages.
To ease exposition, the maximization problem can be broken into two steps:





F(D;h)   pD   w(h);max
h
F(F;h)   pF   w(h)
o
11We abstract from multiunit rms, because data do not permit us to investigate the within-
rm assignment of machines to workers.
12It is straightforward to generalize our results for the case when machines produce dieren-
tiated products. This requires a stronger assumption of log supermodularity on F (see Yeaple
(2005), Costinot and Vogel (2010)).
18The rst-order condition for optimal worker hiring is
Fh(D;hD) = w
0(hD) (7)
if the rm has chosen the domestic machine, and
Fh(F;hF) = w
0(hF) (8)
if it has chosen the foreign one.
Let D = maxh F(D;h)   pD   w(h) denote the maximum prot attainable
with a domestic machine, and F = maxh F(F;h)   pF   w(h) the maximum
prot on a foreign machine. Clearly, the rm decides to buy an imported machine
if and only if F  D, and is indierent if F = D.
3.4 Equilibrium
Because rms are identical ex ante, it is indeterminate which rm hires which
worker. However, the assignment of machines to workers will be pinned down in
equilibrium.
Denition 1. An equilibrium in this economy is (i) a matching function  :
[0;1] ! fD;Fg that maps worker skill to machine quality, (ii) a wage function
w : [0;1] ! R, (iii) a nal good output function q : [0;1] ! R that gives the
amount of nal good produced by rms employing type-h workers, (iv) the price
pD and amount MD of domestic machine production, (v) and the amount MF of
machine imports such that
1. each worker is employed,
2. h solves solves (6) for a machine of type (h),
3. nal good and domestic machine producers make zero prot,
4. and trade is balanced.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium is characterized by a strict sorting of workers of
various skills onto the two types of machines. There exists a cuto h 2 [0;1] such
that all workers below this cuto work on domestic machines, and all workers above





D if h  h;
F if h > h:





F(D;h)   pD if h  h
F(F;h)   pF if h > h:
;
We prove this proposition by constructing the equilibrium step by step.
Labor market clearing and prot maximization. Consider labor markets
rst. There is a positive supply of workers at each skill level h, which means that
there has to be a positive labor demand and positive production q(h) at each skill
level.
For a rm to produce at skill level h, it has to break even. The prot of a
type-h rm is
maxfF(D;h)   pD;F(F;h)   pFg   w(h):
The wage of a type-h worker is hence
w(h) = maxfF(D;h)   pD;F(F;h)   pFg:
Because F(F;h) F(D;h) is strictly increasing in h, there is a complete separa-
tion of operators of foreign and domestic machines. All workers below a cuto skill
h work on domestic machines, and all workers above this cuto work on foreign
machines.
The cuto h is implicitly dened by
F(F;h
)   F(D;h
) = pF   pD: (9)
This condition is intuitive. At the skill level h, the rm is indierent between
buying a domestic or a foreign machine. The productivity advantage of a better
foreign machine is exactly oset by its higher price. Clearly, h increases in the
price dierence pF   pD.






Fh(D;h) if h  h
Fh(H;h) if h > h
satises the rst-order conditions for prot maximum.
Figure 1 illustrates the sorting of workers onto domestic and foreign machines
and the resulting wage function. The wage function is the upper envelope of
the curves F(D;h)   pD and F(F;h)   pF. By assumption of machine-worker











Figure 1: The wage function
Goods market clearing. The supply of type-h rms is q(h) = F((h);h)l(h).








All l(h) workers are employed on a suitable machine, and we integrate over all the
skill levels to obtain aggregate output.13






where L() is the cumulative distribution function of l(). The intuition is that every
worker below skill level h will be assigned a domestic machine.
Each domestic machine requires A units of the nal good, so
QD = AMD = AL(h
)
units of the nal good are sold for domestic machine producers.
Trade balance implies that machine imports equal nal good exports in value,
QF = pFMF;
13This is dierent from Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005), who assume that rms produce





l(h)dh = L   L(h
)
is the number of foreign machines needed to employ the remaining workers.
The remaining part of production,
QC = Q   QD   QF
is consumed, and it follows from Walras' law, that this is exactly the amount
demanded for consumption. Given that there are no prots in the economy, con-
sumption equals the total wage bill, wL.
This completes the characterization of the equilibrium.
From Figure 1 it is clear that workers using an imported machine are (i) more
skilled, (ii) earn higher wages than those on a domestic machine. They also have
a higher return to skill than if they worked on a domestic machine. All these
predictions are consistent with the evidence discussed in Section 2.
3.5 Trade liberalization
Consider a reduction in the taris levied on imported machines. What is the eect
of this liberalization in this economy? Which rms will upgrade to better foreign
machines? What is the eect on wages?
We study unilateral liberalization that only aects imports, not exports. We
want to focus on import liberalization, the eects of which are less understood than
those of export liberalization. Also note that in our model all rms are indierent
between exporting or not because there are no xed costs of exporting. That
is, even if we allowed for multilateral liberalization, all rms would be aected
symmetrically by the increasing export demand.
As taris decline, so does the price of of foreign machines: ~ pF < pF. (This is a
small open economy.) The lower ~ pF raises the protability of rms using foreign
machines. In equilibrium, a wider range of rms will use imported machines.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparative static exercise. As pF declines to ~ pF, the
wage curve of importers shifts upward, and the skill cuto h decreases to ~ h. As
imported machines become cheaper, they become available for a wider range of
workers.
Workers (and rms) can be split into three groups. Workers with skill level be-












Figure 2: Trade liberalization and worker-machine assignment
domestic machines before, but switch to an imported machine after liberalization.
Workers above skill level h continue to use imported machines.14
The new function is denoted by ~ w(h). Switchers enjoy a wage gain of F(F;h) 
F(D;h) + pD   ~ pF, even while h is held xed. This is consistent with evidence
that workers whose employer has purchased a foreign machine receive higher wages
afterwards, controlling for (synthetic) individual xed eects.
Interestingly, continuing importers also enjoy wage increases. This is due to a
general equilibrium eect. Because imported machines are now cheaper, if skilled
wages remained the same, new entrants would make a prot by buying an imported
machine and hiring a skilled worker. Competition for the most skilled workers
increases their wage, even if in equilibrium their employer does not upgrade their
machine.
In addition to matching the empirical ndings discussed in Section 2, the model
yields two interesting testable predictions. The rst considers the timing of im-
14Strictly speaking, we cannot make similar statements about rms, because a rm with an
h1 worker before liberalization can freely re her and hire an h2 worker instead. This is because
all potential input combinations bring zero prot for all rms. We can, however, introduce the
tie-breaking rule that a rm does not re its workers unless this brings positive prots. This can
be motivated by innitesimal hiring or ring costs. In this case, all rms retain their workers,
and we can refer to rms and workers interchangeably.
23ports. Firms with the best workers start importing rst. The productivity of their
skilled operators makes it protable for them to buy the better machine even when
taris are high. As taris continue to fall, the threshold of importers keeps falling
and rms with worse and worse workers start importing.
We take this prediction to the data. Because worker skills are unobservable, we
use the ranking of the worker within the wage distribution of her occupation as a
proxy. In the model, there is a monotonic relationship between skill and wage rank:
the most skilled workers will receive the highest wages, and so on.15 Conveniently,
the rank has the same [0;1] support as the skill distribution.
Looking at workers in the sample in 2003, we ask when their rm rst started
importing their specic machine. Workers are split into two groups: \early im-
porters" are those who were among the rst 50 percent of workers to receive im-
ported machines. That is, at the time of their machine import, less than 50 percent
of workers in their occupation had already been exposed to imported machines.
\Late importers" are the complementary group, those who purchased their im-
ported machine when already more than 50 percent of workers had one.16
Figure 3 plots the kernel density estimates of the wage rank of workers within
the two groups. The unconditional density of wage rank is the uniform density
on [0;1]. Relative to the unconditional density, the better workers (above the
median) are overrepresented among early importers, and underrepresented among
late importers. This pattern is clearly consistent with the model, as lower ranked
workers are seen to switch to imported machines later.
The second prediction is that as imported machines become more widespread,
even those who are already on an imported machine gain higher wages. To check
this prediction in the data, we ask how the prevalence of importing within a
worker's occupation aects her wages. More specically, for each worker in each
year we calculate the fraction of workers in the same occupation who already have
an imported machine. In the model, this fraction corresponds to 1   L(h)=L.
Because importer wages decrease in h, they should increase in the prevalence of
importers.
We regress the (log) wage of a worker on her import dummy and its interac-
tion with the fraction of workers already importing. Table 7 reports the results.
15It is important to use the rank, rather than the actual wage to proxy for skill. Actual
wage is aected by not only the machine the worker is operating, but also by the entire equilib-
rium assignment. The wage rank, however, only depends on h because w(h) is always strictly
increasing.
16Strictly speaking, we cannot be sure that these operators worked at the same rm when the
imports took place. When we repeat the exercise using the worker sample at the time of imports,
we get very similar results.
24Figure 3: Distribution of workers by the time of their rst import
Regressions include rm size and foreign ownership and occupationyear xed ef-
fects, and individual controls. Because occupation trends soak up the variation in
import prevalence, we can only evaluate its interaction with the import dummy.
As predicted by the model, the prevalence of imports aects importers more than
non-importers.
The mean within-occupation prevalence of importers is 0.46. In an occupationyear
with this prevalence, the wage gap between importers and non-importers is 0:46 
11:8 + 4:7 = 10:1 percent. When import prevalence rises to its 75th percentile,
0.69, the wage gap increases to 12.8 percent.
4 Robustness
In this section, we oer some robustness checks of the main results on the wage gap
between importers and non-importers. We study robustness to measurement error
in our import exposure dummy or in the occupation classication, working with
dierent samples, and separating the eect of foreign and domestic ownership.
We estimate our main specication, equation (3) in various alternative speci-
cations. Table 8 reports the results. For convenience, column 1 reproduces the
baseline specication, reported in column 2 of Table 4.
Column 2 reports the results of the regression when run on only those occu-
pations that have a single worker at the rm. (In the baseline specications we
allowed for up to 20 workers in the same occupation.) This minimizes the measure-
25Table 7: Import prevalence and wages
(1) (2)
Imported machine specific to occupation 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.014)
  * import prevalence 0.118*** 0.054**
(0.023) (0.026)
Imported some machine -0.036**
(0.017)
  * import prevalence 0.144***
(0.026)
Firm employment (log) 0.071*** 0.065***
(0.003) (0.003)
Firm has majority foreign owner 0.232*** 0.224***
(0.007) (0.007)
Individual controls YES YES
Occupation*year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 98,225 98,225
R-squared 0.414 0.416
Notes: All regressions control for gender, a dummy for completed high school, 
age, age squared, and occupation*year fixed effects (coefficients not reported). 
Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered by firm*year. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 See text for sample definition and other details.
Log monthly earnings
ment error stemming from the fact that we do not know who within the aected
occupation actually receives the machine. Consistent with smaller attenuation
bias, the estimated eect of import exposure is indeed larger, 9 percent, though
this is not statistically dierent from the baseline estimate of 8 percent. Also note
that this specication severely restricts the sample, and the sample size drops to
one fth.
Column 3 reproduces the same regression as column 1, run on the sample that
is used in the pseudo-panel specication (Table 5). In this sample, we only use
workers that are uniquely identied by their gender, year of birth, schooling and
occupation, and are staying at the rm for at least four years. Again, the sample
is much smaller than in the baseline specication, but the wage eect of imported
machines is similar.
Because our identication relies heavily on the occupation descriptions, one
might worry about reporting error in the occupation code. We address this issue




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the following way. The Hungarian Statistical Oce reports a list of \related but
distinct occupations" for each occupation. For example, \spinners," \weavers,"
27and \knitters" are related to, but distinct from \textile machine operators." To
allow for the possibility of miscoding, we group all related occupations together and
rerun the main specication on this dataset. The results are reported in column
4. Because we also look at related occupations, there are many more workers in
the sample (264,606). The eect of imported machines on wages is similar, though
somewhat smaller. This is consistent with the notion that the original coding
does contain some useful information about the worker's occupation, which we
lose when grouping dierent occupations together.
Column 5 reports regression results for large rms only. The wage premium of
importers is similar, though somewhat smaller, potentially because the chances of
false positives (assigning the imported machine to someone not exposed to it) is
larger in large rms.
Columns 6 and 7 split the sample into domestically and foreign-owned rms.
The baseline estimates are very similar, suggesting that there are no large dier-
ences in the skill-complementarity of imports between domestic and foreign rms.
At the same time, importers tend to pay much higher wages to unaected workers
among foreign rms than among domestic rms. This suggests that there may
be complementarities between the dierent modes of global engagement (imports,
foreign investment) of the rm. We wish to study such complementarities in future
research.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimated the eect of capital imports on the wages of a large, represen-
tative sample of Hungarian machine operators. Using linked employer-employee
data and detailed product- and rm-level import data, we matched the precise
occupation description of each worker to the equipment imported by their em-
ployers. We found that machine operators working on imported machines earn
8 percent more than those working on domestic machines. Estimating a struc-
tural assignment model of heterogenous workers and machines, we concluded that
about one third of this wage gap is due to the higher returns to skill on imported
machines, and two thirds are due to the higher skill of imported machine opera-
tors. Our structural estimates also suggest that imported machines contributed
substantially to the increase in wage inequality in Hungary. Our results highlight
a novel mechanism of skill-biased technical change.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Matching machines to their operators
We match the 4-digit FEOR occupation code of machine operators to the 6-digit
Harmonized System product code of capital goods. There are 61 FEOR codes
involving the operation of a machine (excluding vehicle drivers), see Table A.1.
31There are 260 HS codes describing specialized machines and instruments. We
match each occupation to at least one, potentially several machines that they can
be working on. The matching is done as follows.
Table A.1: List of machine operating occupations in the data
 
FEOR Description 
8111  Food products machine operators 
8112  Beverage products machine operators 
8113  Tobacco products machine operators 
8121  Textile industry machine operators and 
production-line workers 
8122  Dressmaking machine operators and 
production-line workers 
8123  Leather tanning and processing machine 
operators and production-line workers 
8124  Shoemaking machine operators and 
production-line workers 
8125  Wood processing machine operators and 
production-line workers 
8126  Paper and pulp industry machine operators 
8127  Printing machine operators 
8129  Light industry machine operators and 
production-line workers n.e.c. 
8131  Petroleum refinery and processing machine 
operators 
8132  Gas-making and processing machine operators
8133  Basic chemicals and chemical products 
machine operators 
8134  Pharmaceutical products machine operators 
8135  Fertilizer and plant-protection products 
machine operators 
8136  Plastic processing machine operators 
8137  Rubber goods manufacturers, vulcanizers 
8141  Ceramic products machine operators 
8142  Fine ceramics products machine operators 
8143  Glass and glass-products machine operators 
8144  Concrete building block machine operators 
8145  Lime and cement products machine operators 
8149  Building materials industry machine operators 
n.e.c. 
8191  Metallurgical machine operators 
8192  Metal working machine operators 
8193 Production-line  assemblers 
8199  Processing machine operators, production-line 
workers n.e.c. 
8211  Solid minerals extraction machine operators 






8221  Power-production and transformation plant 
mechanics and operators 
8222  Coal- or oil-fired power-generating plant 
operators 
8223  Nuclear-fuelled power-generating plant 
operators 
8224  Hydroelectric power-generating station 
mechanics and machine operators 
8229  Power production and related plant operators 
n.e.c. 
8231  Water works machine operators 
8232  Sewage plant operators 
8233  Water pump operators 
8239  Water treatment plant operators n.e.c. 
8240 Packaging-machine  operators 
8291  Boiler operators (licensed boilermen) 
8292  Decontaminating machine and equipment 
operators 
8293  Agricultural machine operators, mechanics 
8299  Other non-manufacturing machine operators 
n.e.c. 
8311  Agricultural engine drivers and operators 
8312  Forestry plant operators 
8313  Plant protection machine operators 
8319  Agricultural and forestry mobile-plant drivers, 
operators n.e.c. 
8321  Earth moving equipment operators 
8322  Groundwork machine operators 
8323  Road, bridge and railroad building machine 
operators 
8324  Hydromechanical and floating plant operators 
8325  Well drilling machine operators 
8329  Construction machine operators n.e.c. 
8331  Scavengery machine operators and drivers 
8332  Cesspool-pumping, sewage-collecting truck 
operators 
8341 Crane  operators 
8342  Elevator and conveying machine operators 
8343 Lift-trolley  operators 
8344  Loading/unloading machine operators 
8349 Material  conveying  machine operators n.e.c. 
 
32Table A.2: Tags used for machines and occupations
agriculture, assembly, basic metals, beverage, cement and concrete, ce-
ramics, chemicals, cleaning, construction, electric, fabricated metals,
food, glass, heating and cooling, leather, mining, moving, oil and gas,
other, packaging, paper, pharmaceuticals, plastic, power, printing, ra-
diation, rubber, stone and minerals, textile, tobacco, vehicle, vessel,
water, wood
First, we tagged both occupations and products with simple tags relating to the
broad industry in which they might operate. We used 34 tags (Table A.2). Each
occupation or product could have received multiple tags. Among the occupation{
machine matches that have at least one tag in common, we used the detailed
description of the occupation to narrow down the set of machines that are used
by this worker. This procedure was carried out independently by ve people, and
we selected the matches that were agged by at least three of them. (Results are
robust to dierent cutos.) This resulted in 354 matches.
The average worker is matched with 5.5 machines, and the average machine is
matched with 1.3 occupations. Table A.3 displays 20 randomly selected matches.
The full list of matches is available upon request.
33Table A.3: A list of 20 randomly selected matches
FEOR Occupation description HS6 Product description
8112 Beverage products machine operators 843880 Industrial machinery nes for food, drink preparation
8121
Textile industry machine operators and production-line 
workers
844519 Textile fibre preparing machines nes
8125
Wood processing machine operators and production-
line workers
846595 Drilling or morticing machines for wood, etc
8125
Wood processing machine operators and production-
line workers
846596 Splitting, slicing or paring machines for wood, etc
8192 Metal working machine operators 846040 Honing or lapping machines
8192 Metal working machine operators 846190 Metal cuttting, shaping, filing, engrave machines, nes
8192 Metal working machine operators 846221 Num controlled machine tools to bend, fold, etc, metal
8199
Processing machine operators, production-line workers 
n.e.c.
847940 Rope or cable-making machines
8222 Coal- or oil-fired power-generating plant operators 840681 Turbines n.e.s., of output <40mw
8222 Coal- or oil-fired power-generating plant operators 850239 Electric generating sets
8224
Hydroelectric power-generating station mechanics and 
machine operators
841011 Hydraulic turbines, water wheels, power < 1000 kW
8293 Agricultural machine operators, mechanics 842481 Agricultural sprays and powder dispersers
8293 Agricultural machine operators, mechanics 843210 Ploughs
8299 Other non-manufacturing machine operators n.e.c. 842489 Sprays/powder dispersing machines except agricultural
8311 Agricultural engine drivers and operators 843210 Ploughs
8319
Agricultural and forestry mobile-plant drivers, 
operators n.e.c.
843352 Threshing machinery nes
8323 Road, bridge and railroad building machine operators 843049 Boring or sinking machinery nes, not self-propelled
8323 Road, bridge and railroad building machine operators 843050 Construction equipment, self-propelled nes
8325 Well drilling machine operators 843049 Boring or sinking machinery nes, not self-propelled
8344 Loading/unloading machine operators 842790 Trucks with lifting/handling equipment, non-powered
34